Kyrgyzstan Brief, Issue 9 by -

ABOUT IPP
The Institute for Public Policy (IPP) is an independent, non-partisan research and policy-making institution, based 
in Bishkek. Its goals are to develop and promote participatory approach in establishing public policy; to strengthen 
expert analysis in order to promote eff ective decisionmaking in matters of public policy and to create an indepen-
dent platform for dialogue on public policy issues. The Institute provides expert consulting, research and surveys on 
Central Asian aff airs, confl  ict management services as well as implementation of educational and cultural projects 
aimed at good governance.
Institute for Public Policy 
42/1 Isanov kochosu
Bishkek 720017
Kyrgyzstan
Tel/Fax: +996(312) 906240
Email:: of ce@ipp.kg
Website: http://www.ipp.kg
The publication was supported by a grant from:
No part of this publication may be reproduced without permission of the Institute for Public Policy
OSI Assistance Foundation
K
Y
R
G
Y
ZS
TA
N
 B
R
IE
F 
  I
ss
ue
 �
 9
                                           MARCH - APRIL 2007
CONTENTS
Central Asia in 2007: Dynamics of Change and 
Development
Regional conference summary .....................2
Evaluation of Political Situation after April 19         
Round table summary  ..................................3
Kyrgyzstan: Democratic Success or Threat 
to Stability?
Valentin Bogatyrev ......................................4
“Authorities-Opposition” Tandem in 2007                   
Bakyt Beshimov  ...........................................6
Issues of National Statehood in Central Asia               
Muratbek Imanaliev ......................................9
What Hampers Economic Growth in the Kyrgyz 
Republic?
Rafkat Khasanov .......................................12
Tax Reforms: Myths and Reality                          
Sergei Sabko .............................................17
Challenges of developing effective state policy 
on water resources management
Roundtable summary ................................20
Geopolitical Aspects of the Problem of 
Regional Integration in Central Asia                     
Farkhod Tolipov .........................................21
Valentin Bogatyrev: 
“Development is 
instability. Any stability is a 
sign of stagnation or a latent 
accumulation of possible 
social explosions. In the 
view of such a paradigm of 
development, Kyrgyzstan 
is the most stable state 
in Central Asia since the 
processes of development 
are taking place here, and 
the ‘lid is off the cauldron’; 
everything boils and rages, 
but it will not explode. 
With this I could  nish my 
reasoning.  ” - p.5
ABOUT IPP
The Institute for Public Policy (IPP) is an independent, non-partisan research and policy-making institution, based 
in Bishkek. Its goals are to develop and promote participatory approach in establishing public policy; to strengthen 
expert analysis in order to promote eff ective decisionmaking in matters of public policy and to create an indepen-
dent platform for dialogue on public policy issues. The Institute provides expert consulting, research and surveys on 
Central Asian aff airs, confl  ict management services as well as implementation of educational and cultural projects 
aimed at good governance.
Institute for Public Policy 
42/1 Isanov kochosu
Bishkek 720017
Kyrgyzstan
Tel/Fax: +996(312) 906240
Email:: of ce@ipp.kg
Website: http://www.ipp.kg
The publication was supported by a grant from:
No part of this publication may be reproduced without permission of the Institute for Public Policy
OSI Assistance Foundation
K
Y
R
G
Y
ZS
TA
N
 B
R
IE
F 
  I
ss
ue
 �
 9
                                           MARCH - APRIL 2007
CONTENTS
Central Asia in 2007: Dynamics of Change and 
Development
Regional conference summary .....................2
Evaluation of Political Situation after April 19         
Round table summary  ..................................3
Kyrgyzstan: Democratic Success or Threat 
to Stability?
Valentin Bogatyrev ......................................4
“Authorities-Opposition” Tandem in 2007                   
Bakyt Beshimov  ...........................................6
Issues of National Statehood in Central Asia               
Muratbek Imanaliev ......................................9
What Hampers Economic Growth in the Kyrgyz 
Republic?
Rafkat Khasanov .......................................12
Tax Reforms: Myths and Reality                          
Sergei Sabko .............................................17
Challenges of developing effective state policy 
on water resources management
Roundtable summary ................................20
Geopolitical Aspects of the Problem of 
Regional Integration in Central Asia                     
Farkhod Tolipov .........................................21
Valentin Bogatyrev: 
“Development is 
instability. Any stability is a 
sign of stagnation or a latent 
accumulation of p ssibl  
social explosions. In the 
view f uch a paradigm of 
development, Kyrgyzstan 
is the ost stable state 
in Central Asia since the 
proc sses of development 
re taking place here, and 
the ‘lid is off the cauldron’; 
everything boils and rages, 
but it will not explode. 
With this I could  nish y 
reasoning.  ” - p.5
ABOUT IPP
The Institute for Public Policy (IPP) is an independent, non-partisan esearch and policy-making in titution, based 
in Bishkek. Its goals are to develop and promote partici atory app oach in establishing public policy; to strengthen 
expert analysis in order to promote eff ective decisio m king in m tters of public policy and to create an indepen-
dent platform for dialogue on public policy issues. The Institute provides exp rt consulting, research and surveys on 
Central Asian aff airs, confl  ict management services as well as implementation of educational and cultural projects 
aimed at good governance.
Institute for Public Policy 
42/1 Isanov kochosu
Bishkek 720017
Kyrgyzstan
Tel/Fax: +996(312) 906240
Email:: of ce@ipp.kg
Website: http://www.ipp.kg
The publication was supported by a grant from:
No part of this publication may be reproduced without permission of the Institute for Public Policy
OSI Assistance Foundation
K
Y
R
G
Y
ZS
TA
N
 B
R
IE
F 
  I
ss
ue
 �
 9
                                           MARCH - APRIL 2007
CONTENTS
Central Asia in 2007: Dynamics of Change and 
Development
Regional conference summary .....................2
Evaluation of Political Situati  after April 19         
Round table summary  ..................................3
Kyrgyzstan: Democratic Succe s or Threat 
to Stability?
Valentin Bogatyrev ......................................4
“Authorities-Opposition” Tandem in 2007                   
Bakyt Beshimov  ...........................................6
Issues of National St tehood in Central Asia               
Muratbek Imanaliev ......................................9
What Hampers Economic Growth in the Kyrgyz 
Republic?
Rafkat Khasanov .......................................12
T x Reforms: Myths and Reality                          
Sergei Sabko .............................................17
Challenges of developing effective state policy 
on water resources management
Roundtable summary ................................20
Geopolitical Aspects f the Problem of 
Regional Integration in Central Asia                     
Farkhod Tolipov .........................................21
Valentin Bogatyrev: 
“Development is 
instability. Any stability is a 
sign of stagnation or a latent 
accumulation of po sible 
social explosions. In he 
view of such a par digm of 
development, Kyrgyzstan 
is the most stab e state 
in Central Asia since the
processes of development 
are taking place h re, and
the ‘lid is off the cauldron’; 
everything boils an  rages, 
but it will not explode. 
With this I could  nish my 
reasoning.  ” - p.5
-2-
CENTRAL ASIA IN 2007: DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT
K
Y
R
G
Y
ZS
TA
N
 B
R
IE
F 
  I
ss
ue
 �
 9
On 2 March 2007 the Institute for Public Policy hosted a 
regional conference “Central Asia in 2007: Dynamics of 
Change and Development.” The event gathered over 30 
leading experts - political and economic analysts from 
Central Asian states as well as the Ukraine and Armenia.
The conference was organized in two sections. 
The section “Political dynamics: changes and 
implications” was devoted to a discussion of the 
political development model of Central Asian states 
and issues related to the substance and dynamics 
of democratization and modernization. The section 
“Geopolitics and geo-economics of Central Asia” 
featured discussion of the issues of regional integration, 
the roles of political, economic and military international 
organizations, perspectives of energy cooperation etc. 
In his welcome speech, the State Secretary of the 
Kyrgyz Republic Adakhan Madumarov noted that 
Kyrgyzstan, being the geographic center of Central Asia, 
has also been turning into its political center. Despite 
various political issues, Kyrgyzstan is consistently 
progressing in democratization. The current unstable 
political situation is a natural stage of development 
of Kyrgyzstani society, according to Mr. Madumarov. 
“At the moment our society is in the process of 
self-learning, self-identifi cation. Everything that 
has been taking place in this country suggests 
that we are very active,” Madumarov said. 
Discussing the development of the democratic process in 
Central Asian states, the conference participants argued 
that while various real and imaginary reforms have been 
taking place, two things remain constant: the countries 
still have a super-presidential form of governance and 
substantial dialogue on democratization remains lacking 
between Central Asian countries and the developed 
democracies of the West. The latter, it was noted, is 
not least related to the superfi cial attitude of western 
countries to the region. Thus, out of the EU countries, 
only Germany has an embassy in Bishkek; the rest deal 
with Kyrgyzstan from Astana or cities even further 
afi eld, which is not conducive to sustainable dialogue. 
Aleksandr Iskandaryan, director of the Caucasus Media 
Institute suggested that when assessing the political 
dynamics of post-Soviet states, three groups could be 
identifi ed, based on the countries’ experience with a 
rotation of the political elite. There are countries whose 
societies accept the rotation of the ruling elite, such 
as the Baltic States. The second group, which includes 
most of the Central Asian states, consists of countries 
that have not yet experienced rotation at all, or where 
power is inherited. These countries simply lack the 
mechanisms for accepting the results of power rotation. 
Between these two groups there is a grey zone - 
countries where rotation of the elite has taken place, but 
in a legally ambiguous way. In this group, which includes 
Kyrgyzstan, the unsuccessful party does not accept 
the results of such a rotation, and the political system 
is like boiling cauldron. The big question is whether 
these countries will move and develop towards a better 
system or remain for a longer time in their current state. 
Valentin Bogatyrev, coordinator of Perspektiva Analytical 
Consortium, analyzed one such “boiling cauldron” 
- Kyrgyzstan. According to him, depending on the 
perception of the paradigm of the dynamics of political 
development, Kyrgyzstan could be seen as a democratic 
success or a failing state, to take two extremes. What 
is clear is that stability, at least how it is understood in 
other Central Asian states, has no chance in Kyrgyzstan. 
“Stability is a sign of stagnation or a latent accumulation 
of possible social explosions. Kyrgyzstan is the most 
stable state in Central Asia since the processes of 
development are taking place here, and the ‘lid is 
off  the cauldron’; everything boils and rages, but it 
will not explode,” Bogatyrev said. In conclusion, he 
noted that at any rate, Kyrgyzstan will be a mirror 
for neighboring countries to look into their own 
future, and avoid any mistakes made in Kyrgyzstan.
Continuing with the theme of stability, the director 
of the Central Asian Foundation for Democracy Erkin 
Tukumov suggested that stability, attributed to the 
political situation in Kazakhstan, is deceptive. Everyone 
expects reforms, but they [reforms] are initiated and 
implemented by the authorities, with little chance 
for the public to infl uence the form and substance of 
reforms. The presidential elections of 2005 symbolized 
the beginning of the end of the current political 
period in Kazakhstan, and the main goal of all political 
reforms is to ensure a smooth transition period, he said. 
Farkhod Tolipov, Professor of Political Science of the 
National University of Uzbekistan made a report on 
geopolitical aspects of regional integration in Central 
Asia, triggering a lively debate. According to Mr. Tolipov, 
the role of geopolitical factors on regional integration 
has been steadily increasing, with this infl uence having 
a negative impact on integration. The speaker pointed 
to three main factors that aff ect the chances for Central 
Asian integration. First was joining of Russia into the 
Central Asian Cooperation Organization in 2004, which 
strongly deformed the notion of Central Asia both 
in geographic and political terms. The second factor 
was the summit of the SCO in Astana in 2005, when a 
declaration was adopted demanding that the United 
CENTRAL ASIA IN 2007: DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT
Regional conference summary
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EVALUATION OF POLITICAL SITUATION AFTER APRIL 19
States determine the date of withdrawal of military 
bases from the territory of Central Asian states. As Mr. 
Tolipov put it, it was not the will of Central Asian states; 
rather they followed the interests of larger powers. The 
third blow to regional integration was the liquidation 
of the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, which 
joined the EEC (Eurasian Economic Community). 
“Now the region exists in wider structures, as some 
dissolved entity. We have the EEC, SCO and Americans 
lobbying the idea of a “Bigger Central Asia”, including 
Afghanistan into Central Asia. So, Central Asia has 
ended up between three powers. It is not a subject 
but an object of politics, and thus, is turning into 
the victim of a geopolitical game,” Tolipov said. 
President of the Institute for Public Policy, Ambassador 
Muratbek Imanaliev noted that regional integration 
is hampered by several factors, one of which is a very 
low awareness of Central Asian states about each 
other, despite common history, culture, language etc. 
“It seemed to us that it would be diffi  cult to build 
relations with China, since we have no knowledge 
of it. But in fact, it turned out that it is much more 
diffi  cult to learn about our neighbors. The majority 
of people in Kyrgyzstan know more about China 
than Kazakhstan,” Ambassador Imanaliev said.
He also touched on the problem of unpredictable 
foreign policy among Central Asian states, 
conditioned by “suddenly acquired independence 
syndrome” as well as the degradation of social 
relations and values, and a crisis of religions. 
The conference speakers also covered the issues 
of the institutionalization of political power 
and political opposition, perspectives on the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, relations of 
Central Asia with western countries and Russia, 
perspectives of economic cooperation and others.
Round table summary 
EVALUATION OF POLITICAL SITUATION AFTER APRIL 19, 2007
The Institute for Public Policy held meeting of experts of 
the institute to discuss current political situation on April 
20, 2007. The discussion was initiated in light of April 19 
events, when authorities dispersed opposition rally that 
started on April 11, 2007 at the central square in Bishkek. 
Round table participants stressed fi rst of all that the April 
19 event brought victory to neither side. According to 
the experts, such a confrontation weakened not only the 
opposition but also the authorities. “Events in Kyrgyzstan 
are in a new, unpredictable phase of development that 
can have serious consequences,” participants said. 
Firstly, the April rally seriously discredited the opposition 
(opposition meaning one element of democracy, as 
a phenomenon, but not a particular group of people.) 
Experts said that most opposition leaders, who were 
for system changes, became hostages of the tactics 
chosen by the United Front leaders. “The rally was 
aimed at the quick achievement of announced goals, 
but there were no real preconditions for them and 
that is why the tactic was initially futile,” experts said. 
Statements of the “For reforms!” movement leaders 
saying that they suspend the rally and at the same time 
the silence of the United Front leaders, shows that there 
is a division in the processes between “reformists” and 
“front” members, experts said. According to them, all 
opposition forces will need time and they have to search 
for new formats for their activity to restore their positions.
Secondly, actions of the authorities prior to, during and 
after the rally demonstrated that they do not realize 
and undertake the necessary reforms. “The behavior 
of the authorities is penetrated by a desire to win, 
save itself or fi ght back, but not by understanding the 
need for real reforms for the country’s development 
and securing consent from among the population,” 
they said. According to participants, if the authorities 
continue conducting reforms only under pressure 
and threat, political tensions will only increase. 
Round table participants said that activities of the 
authorities immediately after April 19 demonstrate their 
desire to “kill” opposition in moral and informational 
terms. One can observe that the role of law enforcement 
structures in politics is strengthening, and it is expected 
that along with information and legal accusations, 
authorities might start a “shadow” attack against the 
opposition activists. According to participants, such 
methods will not solve the problems of authority, 
but rather on the contrary, augment antagonism 
in society and lay the foundation for new tensions. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, the April confrontation 
led to the regional division problem strengthening. 
It is evident, that both authority and opposition used 
regionalism as the main resource to mobilize support 
among the population, thus infecting politicians of 
various levels, and also ordinary people with a “spirit 
of revanchism”. Experts said that all political groups 
need to realize that in certain conditions regional 
division can occur in hours, and not only along a 
“north-south” divide. Both “south” and “north” can in 
their turns be divided into several other fragments. 
Round table participants believe that every increase in 
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regional tension creates and encourages the prerequisites 
for dictatorship, or the fragmentation of the country and 
society. “The role of local “batyrs” (heroes) strengthens 
with the background of a common disappointment in 
authority and opposition leaders, and already this year can 
be seen as a real threat to the country’s unity,” experts said. 
Solutions to the problem of regional division fi rst of all 
depend on the authority’s policy; the main player in 
the political fi eld, experts said. According to experts, 
one of the solutions to the problem could be change 
of form of authority organization, giving it “corporate” 
structure. “Today it is almost impossible to conduct 
presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan because the country 
would divide into two parts,” experts said and “that is 
why it is necessary to fi nd optimal ways out of the crisis.” 
They said that the press plays an important role in the 
“promotion” of the regionalism, without even realizing 
it. “The very media creates symbols of regionalism and 
promotes odious fi gures. It is necessary to save the media 
from divisive tendencies, to agree and observe certain 
ethical norms in informing the population,” experts said. 
In conclusion, participants expressed the hope that the 
authorities will not celebrate a “victory”, but will make real 
steps to reform the political system and preserve unity in 
society, and opposition leaders in their turn will continue to 
promote the creation of an eff ective and democratic state. 
Valentin Bogatyrev, an expert of the IPP, Coordinator of the Analytical Consortium 
“Perspectiva” and Vice-President of the Central Asian Intellectual Foundation “Vostok”.
KYRGYZSTAN: DEMOCRATIC SUCCESS OR THREAT TO STABILITY?
The answer to the question posed as a topic 
for numerous discussions will be straight if 
you ask people from neighboring countries or 
someone from Europe. But at the same time the 
answers will be the total opposite of each other.
If for the western community the Kyrgyz Republic, with 
certain qualifi cations, is undoubtedly a state, which in 
democratic development moved ahead of its neighbors, 
then experts, politicians, and even ordinary people in 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Russia and Turkmenistan 
will fi rst of all respond that the Kyrgyz Republic is 
the main source of a threat to stability in Central Asia.
Which answer is correct? Everything depends on 
what paradigm of development one adheres to. 
There are two main viewpoints regarding 
what is happening in Central Asia at present.
One of them is that these states have completed 
their short way towards democracy and a market 
economy. The situation of quasi-democracy and quasi-
market that has formed in these states is the fi nal 
stage that Central Asia has come to, and this is the 
proper way prepared for the countries of the region.
From this position the events of the last seven years 
that have been taking place in the Kyrgyz Republic 
could be assessed as post-reformation or even 
counter-reformation.  The reason for which, in my 
view, was in the modernization ‘overheat’ experienced 
by the country during the fi rst three to fi ve years of 
its independence. The dynamically transformational 
regime, incongruent in its temporality with the regional 
political and socio-cultural environment, has generated 
what we see in Kyrgyzstan: a negative change in 
cultural normatives, political destruction, and an 
ideological vacuum. Coupled with a quasi-democracy 
this is undoubtedly an explosive mix, which could for 
a long time question the idea of Kyrgyz statehood and 
also create a number of problems for our neighbors.
I should note that it would be absolutely incorrect to 
ascribe these phenomena to the new administration. 
Rather, to the contrary: it is a product of them.
Another position is that the states of the region are 
moving along the way to a fi nal point of a democratic 
society and free economy. From this position, the 
past fi fteen years should be viewed only as the fi rst 
stage. Peculiar to this stage was an attempt to formally 
change social organization and economic relations. 
From this point of view, the political systems of Central 
Asian states are in the process of transformation. 
However, this process has wider time frames than was 
expected, and has its own peculiar features, which 
distinguish it from classical notions of democracy.
In this context what is happening in Kyrgyzstan is 
undoubtedly a hope for democratic development, 
since no one disputes the fact that our country, 
more than all other Central Asian post-Soviet 
states, has advanced on the way to democracy.
But there is a third viewpoint according to which 
Kyrgyzstan is a disintegrating state, the state which failed 
to retain its statehood. Adherents of this view interpret 
the events of the last two years in the Kyrgyz Republic 
as a disintegration, and foresee various scenarios for the 
future: becoming a protectorate, becoming a part of 
another state, and partition of the state. It is obvious that 
From a report presented at the conference “Central Asia in 2007: Dynamics of Change 
and Development”, organized by the Institute for Public Policy on 2 March 2007.
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with such assessments, Kyrgyzstan is undoubtedly the 
most dangerous source of destabilization not only for its 
neighbors, but could also generate a hot-spot of global 
impact (sometimes it is called Central Asian Balkans).
What is happening in reality?  How could these 
two realities be combined: Kyrgyzstan - mega-
regional vanguard of democratic development 
and Kyrgyzstan, and a source of social instability?
There is one simple combination: I formulate it in 
the following way: development is instability. Any 
stability is a sign of stagnation or a latent accumulation 
of possible social explosions. In the view of such a 
paradigm of development, Kyrgyzstan is the most 
stable state in Central Asia since the processes of 
development are taking place here, and the ‘lid is off  
the cauldron’; everything boils and rages, but it will 
not explode. With this I could fi nish my reasoning. 
However, of great interest is how exactly the processes 
will develop in the Kyrgyz Republic: what threats 
and risks of development there are, what remains 
in the end and what disappears or transforms. 
The main question is whether the object of all this 
reasoning, the Kyrgyz Republic, indeed remains.
First of all, I will say that I am a proponent of 
the view that our country has the potential for 
development and what has been happening for 
the past seven years is a temporary phenomenon.
At present we have several opportunities. As they say, there 
are always at least two ways out of any no-go situation.
The fi rst one is in restoring the processes 
of development. In this sense the events of 
March 24 and the period after it give optimism.
This is due to two reasons, at any rate.
The fi rst one is the emergence of real politics, a real 
political space in the country. I think that for the fi rst 
time we are dealing with an independent parliament. I 
suppose that for the fi rst time we are close to creating 
non-client political parties. I suppose that for the fi rst 
time independent analytical corps have been formed 
in the country. I suppose that non-governmental 
organizations are also close to real progress in the 
arena of public policy. These four phenomena are 
new for the country and create the basis for a claim 
to the emergence of real politics in our country.
The  second circumstance, which testifi es to the possibility 
of restoration of the processes of development, is 
a keen social demand for a national idea, national 
goals and a national strategy of development. It is 
important that for the fi rst time since independence it 
comes not from the government but from the public.
All of this means that things are not as bad as they seem. 
In fact, on the contrary: things are better than ever.
In  my  view, there  is  only  one  serious  threat  to 
this scenario: launching the process of a permanent 
destruction of the institutions of government. The 
format that led to a change of power in Kyrgyzstan in 
March 2005 has formed a “revolutionary” opposition, 
i.e. an opposition whose activities are directed at 
changing power in itself. A cycle of periodic collapses 
of statehood, a cycle of renewal of politics through 
the total collapse of its own architecture (state, 
social, moral) is being formed. This is a very serious 
threat to countries with unconsolidated statehood.
In order to stop this trend it is necessary in these states 
to have a new opposition, which is oriented not at 
changing power, but at demonstrating its ability to 
become more successful in solving issues being dealt 
with by the authorities. For that the opposition has to 
stop trying to build itself as a force, as external to the 
political system, and shift emphasis from conquering 
power to the development of the country. So far this is 
not happening. For instance, we see that the statement 
of the newly created “United Front” demonstrates 
that its leaders act according to  an old, unproductive 
and very dangerous logic. This is regrettable.
Thus the fi rst way out of the situation- let us call 
it the active scenario- is in a full launch of the 
political resources and the intellectual potential of 
the country. Whether this is possible is a matter of 
political will, not of the President but of the public.
Doubts about its existence today prompt us to propose 
the second way out of the situation. It is about the 
strategy of conservation of the existing situation until 
such time as a critical mass of the new generation of 
intellectuals and politicians come to the political scene.
However, this does not mean that nothing happens 
in the coming years. On the contrary, these years are 
extremely important. The next two to three years, 
including the year 2007 will be extremely important 
from the point of view of forming the foundation and 
resources for a new breakthrough in development.
I am not inclined to overestimate another danger, at least 
in terms of Kyrgyzstan; the repetition of authoritarianism. 
Yes, when we look at what is happening today, there 
is a clear sense of the growth of autocratic tendencies 
and deviation of the new administration from 
democratic principles. But I suppose that we deal with 
a totally diff erent phenomenon. The period of changing 
ruling elites (and we are experiencing this period) is 
characterized by measures of the new administration 
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In 2006 Kyrgyzstan failed to fi nd way out of stagnation 
and develop a consolidated development strategy, which 
would satisfy all active parts of society: the authorities 
and opposition, political parties and civil society.
Instead  of  a  loudly  announced  8% economic growth, 
a 2.7% growth was barely achieved, and the GDP is 
continuing to decrease. Despite the fact that the new 
authorities position themselves as “industrialists”, the 
economic situation is developing in the opposite 
direction: there is a considerable reduction of the 
volume of output in industry, the price index of 
producers of industrial output increased by more 
than 15%, the defi cit of trade balance increased by 
2.2 times, the growth of medium and big enterprises 
almost stopped, whereas the growth of small 
enterprises and individual entrepreneurs is insignifi cant.
The growth of consumer prices, preservation of 
general wages arrears, and the grave crime rate 
disturbs the population. Emigration keeps growing: 
25,000 Kyrgyzstanis left the country in 2005 and 
26,500 in 2006. The number of HIV-infected is growing 
at a catastrophic pace - compared to 2005, in 2006 
it increased almost by 50%. Over 60% of all crimes 
are serious crimes and felonies, whereas robberies, 
economic crimes and drug traffi  cking are on the rise. 
It  should  be  acknowledged  that  such  a  situation 
has been developing for years and the main 
reason for this is the vicious system of a corrupt 
government, which has turned into an instrument 
for plundering the country’s wealth. Not only has the 
state, an excessive bureaucratic machine, become 
an insatiable monster, devouring the country - but 
it has also turned into an obstacle to development.
The share of state expenses in the country’s GDP 
remains high at the level of 27-28%. In 2006 34.3% of 
the national budget was allocated for maintenance of 
the state machine. Thus, the Kyrgyz bureaucracy is not 
only a heavy burden on the national budget but also the 
main drain on the people’s wealth and their incomes.
Infl uential bureaucrats who control the main fi nancial 
expenditures of the country, not the commercial 
and fi nancial bourgeoisie, are referred to as “the new 
Kyrgyz.” The underlying problem is in the absence of 
a separation between business and power. Business 
has administrative resources, whereas power is money 
motivated. Thus, the nomenclature devours Kyrgyzstan.
The rule of law is non-existent in the country, 
inviolability of private property is virtually absent, 
and many sectors still receive support from the state. 
With such conditions the people naturally expected the 
new administration to eliminate the vicious system and 
begin the policy of creating a system of government 
open to the public, free from corruption, eff ective, and 
generating the growth of  the population’s incomes. 
Moreover, the overwhelming majority of the population 
sincerely believed the promises of the leaders of the 
new administration and at the beginning provided them 
with strong support. However, the fi nal events of 2006, 
as verifi ed by sociological surveys, did not justify the 
expectations of most of those people. The administration 
and opposition failed to fi nd ways for constructive 
cooperation and confrontation defi ned their relations. 
In response to the demands of the people for changing 
the system of government, the political leadership 
responded with a miserable farce of power redistribution 
by adopting two constitutions in two months. 
Bakyt Beshimov, Vice-President of the American University - Central Asia 
“AUTHORITIES-OPPOSITION” TANDEM IN 2007
to retain stability, including political measures, which 
bear little resemblance to democratic forms. The 
need to fi ght the old elites, changing personnel, 
management paradigms and styles - as a rule, all of this 
is impossible to implement in democratic procedures. 
However, the very existence in our history of March 
24, 2005, showing the potential of public forces, 
independent of the authorities. But at least the 
freedom of mass media, in my view, has taken away 
forever the possibility of returning to totalitarianism. 
The general trend of development of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, the orientation of existing processes 
still remains in the sphere of democratic choice. 
Many new social phenomena indicate that this 
direction of development will be preserved.
Now the most unfavorable: In any scenario there is no reason 
to talk about stability. There will no longer be stability, in 
the sense as understood by our neighbors, in Kyrgyzstan. 
Thus, Kyrgyzstan is undoubtedly a threat to stability 
from the point of view of our neighbors and 
Russia. Precisely because it is, and I am sure will 
remain, an example of democratic development.
In any case Kyrgyzstan could be viewed as some 
sort of mirror for its neighbors, with the help of 
which they could look into their future and attempt 
to avoid those mistakes that we may have made.
Published on IPP web site on 5 March 2007
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Negative tendencies in the political system continued in 
2007. The parliament helped ruin the tandem, and Kulov 
founded and headed United Front “For Decent Future of 
Kyrgyzstan”, a new social and political movement, which 
openly stated the need for early presidential elections. 
Thus, for the fi rst time after July 10, 2005 presidential 
elections, Bakiev’s legitimacy as President is being 
openly questioned. Moreover, it is being questioned 
by one of the main participants of the presidential 
campaign. To this very day Bakiev’s strength was that he 
was popularly elected, and Kulov’s attempt to indirectly 
recall his share of votes makes Bakiev’s authority 
unsustainable, creating a new political situation.
The start of a sharp polarization of political interests 
and a deepening feud within political powers are 
the defi ning features of the new political situation. 
De jure Bakiev is a popularly elected president, 
and even his principled opponents to this very day 
acknowledge his right for a constitutional term of 
offi  ce. Beknazarov and Co. questioned the President’s 
ability to meet the best expectations of the people, 
but even they have never openly crossed the line.
After the statement of the United Front, de facto 
supporters of Kulov and part of the opposition do not 
recognize Bakiev’s authority. Some political forces are 
already calling for a referendum to confi rm the President’s 
legitimacy. Structurally a similar situation emerged after 
the infamous Aksy events when de jure Aksy was subject 
to Akaev’s authority, but his authority right up to the 
events of March 2005 was not recognized by residents 
of Aksy. Later non-recognition of the central authority 
spread to a number of regions. At present this process of 
division of the country along political estates may follow 
a dangerous new course. The administration itself created 
such force, and in order to tame or pacify it, authorities 
will have to resort to signifi cant forces and resources. 
At the beginning of 2007 a new Cabinet emerged 
from the ruins of the tandem.  However, the people 
are not in a hurry to call it reformist or innovative. 
The Cabinet, toeing absolutely the President’s line, 
has made two notable steps - they turned down the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and 
moved to a two-level budget. Both steps depending 
on the quality of policy may either strengthen the 
administration or create new unsolvable problems for it. 
Thus, 2007 promises to be a landmark year. There are so 
many problems and contradictions and not enough ways 
to solve them properly. There are so many processes and 
tendencies that have been unfolding for years and so little 
preparation to transform them into positive channels. 
It should be acknowledged that the mass of political 
creative work done by the people, having gone through 
the process of the 2005 revolution, did not continue. 
The victorious part of the political elite divided up the 
power, stopped the revolution but so far has been 
unable to direct the unrealized energy of the people 
into the proper course. The tragedy of this part of 
elite is that it does not understand the similarity of 
the notion of “revolution” to the notion of “justice.”
The defeated politicians, speaking of fundamental 
transformation of the political situation, does not rule 
out the possibility of taking advantage of the discontent 
of a signifi cant part of the population and seizing power. 
The tension that emerged between power groups 
should be reduced, but the question is how. How can 
the increasing inter-regional antagonism be overcome?
In the future events will undoubtedly unfold along the 
course of objective historical and political processes, taking 
into account the realities. Two dangerous precedents 
were set in 2005: seizure of power by using force and 
offi  cial legalization of the dangerous “north-south” 
division through the creation of the tandem. Interference 
of  criminals,  irresponsibility  and  corruptibility of 
the top leadership brought about the situation of 
March 2005 when power was seized through violence. 
The events of November 2006 demonstrated that 
the line between political pressure on the authorities 
and the temptation to seize it by using force is 
very thin. Given mass protests it was very diffi  cult 
to withstand such a temptation. Moreover, the 
politically active part of the population of Kyrgyzstan 
saw fi rst hand that the successful are never blamed.
In the struggle for power the Kyrgyz Communist language 
during Soviet times artifi cially strengthened regional 
division  and local interests. A total domination of the 
Communist bureaucracy concealed its ideology about 
local interests and deeply penetrated social relations. 
During independence the Kyrgyz government 
started to rely mainly on clan relations and that way 
it only strengthened inter-regional antagonisms. 
Such new factors as competition for scarce jobs, 
material resources, spare land in the north of the 
country and position in the state hierarchy also 
contributed to the growth of inter-regional tension.
Corrupt government and a poor economy aggravated 
the negative factor of “us vs. them”. A forced union - a 
tandem, bound by a secret division of all important 
government positions, from the very beginning, 
contained in itself more destructive potential than 
constructive potential. Therefore the tandem could have 
played a positive role only if it existed in a constructive 
form till the next elections and in a worthy manner 
gave way to a new generation of the country’s leaders.
The main mission of the tandem was overcoming 
the dangerous tendency of regional divisions 
and paving the way for balanced development of 
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Kyrgyz politics for the following period. However, 
the mission turned out to be unrealizable.
What should be expected in the forthcoming 
months? To begin with  careful attention should 
be paid to the essence of the authorities and the 
opposition - the main players on the political scene.
For the authorities the clock is ticking, whereas the 
number of problems is drastically increasing. The 
politically active population is not going to be patient. 
The President recently made the second attempt after 
2005 to increase the number of loyal supporters in 
power. According to experts, in the central government 
there are more people who imitate loyalty and have a 
wait-and-see attitude than are really faithful. Even so 
they are trying to expand and strengthen the social 
basis for Bakiev’s administration as well as make positive 
growth in the economy tangible for the population.
So far the authorities are relying on the staunch southern 
electorate and those who have certain benefi ts from 
cooperation with the authorities. The administration could 
also receive the support of those strata of the population 
that are afraid of the radical actions of the opposition 
and think that a lean compromise is better than a fat suit.
The pressure on the part of the mass media on people’s 
opinions, especially among rural populations, is 
continuing with the goal of expanding the support 
base. The positions of the authorities are very weak 
in the ideological sphere. Following the example of 
his predecessor, the President is limiting himself to 
usual protocol, not paying enough attention to the 
expectations of the population, and primarily to the 
expectations of an ideological leadership. More and 
more important questions are accumulating within the 
society regarding the fate of the country, the preservation 
and development of the Kyrgyz nation, its place and 
role in contemporary human civilization. Given the 
lack of proper refl ection on the part of the population 
over these problems, there is an increasing suspicion 
about the unhealthy interests of the administration 
and doubts about its moral right to rule the country.
The main issue is about the willingness and ability of 
the President to break the existing corrupt system and 
become a real leader of progressive transformations. If 
there are not to be tangible results from the fi ght against 
corruption then even the settled opinions of part of the 
southern electorate could change sharply. Such changes 
have already occurred in many people’s opinion in 
the South. It is impossible to continue the course of a 
socially oriented state not increasing the  incomes of the 
population while being at the center of a corrupt system.
On the other hand, democracy is the main resource of 
Kyrgyzstan in the foreign policy sphere. Whatever our 
neighbors say about us, Kyrgyzstan is the most free and 
democratic society in Central Asia with the strongest 
and most stable civil society. Kyrgyzstan is strongly tied 
to international and regional economic relations,  and 
greatly dependent on foreign aid. Assistance to Kyrgyzstan 
in making transformations is of great importance to 
donor-states and international fi nancial institutions, 
and two ideas are of critical importance in this regard 
- fi ghting corruption, and development of democracy. 
The opposition in its present state could 
be divided nominally into three camps.
1. Radical opposition. It includes the United Front 
and radical part of the Movement “For Reforms!” They 
concluded that “the acting head of the state is unable 
to act as a guarantor of the constitutional reform, has 
discredited himself by the previous actions on disruption 
of the constitutional reform as well as practically lost his 
legitimacy as a result of repudiation of commitments 
signed by him, including commitments within the 
framework of the tandem,” and raised the issue of 
early presidential elections. The radical opposition has 
one ideology - fi nish with family rule in the country. 
Many people are ready to support the essence of 
the political claims of the United Front towards the 
authorities, but the proposed solution of crisis puts 
them on their guard. The disenchanted part of the 
electorate will undoubtedly support the actions of the 
United Front and everything will depend on the tactics 
of political struggle. If the leaders of the opposition 
manage to attract the main body of civil society, make 
persuasive steps regarding the southern electorate and, 
foremost, off er a clear and attractive program for the 
country for the coming years, then they may become 
a dominant force in Kyrgyzstan within a short time.
Kulov plays an important role in this. People keep 
accusing him of inconsistency and indecision, and 
even in betraying his genuine supporters when 
he was Prime Minister. The issue is about whether 
he will position himself as an ambitious Kyrgyz 
‘Napoleon’ or a political ‘system designer’ who will fi ght 
corruption and clear the way for the new generation.
The second obstacle in the way of the United Front 
is regionalism. No matter how aggravated regional 
sentiments, no matter how objective are arguments for 
justifi cation of division, still the majority of the Kyrgyz 
people support national unity. Therefore any attempts to 
play on regionalism will in the end discredit any politician. 
Based on a unique political experience accumulated for 
the past 16 years, the capacious Kyrgyz society is able 
to separate the husk of words from the kernel of truth. 
Signifi cantly powerful politicians who profess ideologies 
of regionalism and local interests could be found on the 
extreme right of the authorities and opposition. It is they 
who played on regional passions of the conservative 
part of the electorate during the events of November-
December in 2006. Therefore collision of these forces is 
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inevitable. Dissemination of their ideology of regionalism 
and revanchism among the masses is dangerous.
2. Moderate opposition. These include the socialists, 
nationalists, liberals, and even communists. That is, 
those who add stability of the political system and do 
not allow breaking down the foundations of the state. 
Except communists who wish return to the Soviet 
order, others failed to clearly propose their models 
for the development of Kyrgyzstan. But socialists 
keep maintaining their principles and calling for a 
socially oriented economy, nationalists for a distinct 
development plan, and liberals for more freedom and 
limitation of state interference into public aff airs. A large 
number of non-governmental organizations are also 
part of this circle. Notwithstanding their diff erences, 
they are united by their aspiration for positive changes, 
since according to them, the new administration failed 
to become a force for progress and hinders the country’s 
development. However, the moderate opposition wants 
changes through constitutional democratic means - on 
the basis of elections. The radical part of the opposition 
does not appeal to them by its excessive ambitiousness, 
inconsistency, and lack of a clear program of action. The 
moderate opposition may turn into a powerful political 
force if they manage to create a solid coalition aimed 
at a concentrated informing of the electorate, and by 
putting pressure on the authorities to make reforms.
If the authorities fail to appreciate their role in society, 
and establish constructive relations with it, then many 
moderate opposition fi gures will go for a favorable alliance 
with the radical opposition and question the need for such 
executive power. As demonstrated by history, one must 
deal with such things skillfully and not harbor grudges.
3. Favorites-situationists. This is a very common 
phenomenon in post-Soviet states where positions 
of the opposition are not regulated legally, politically, 
nor with relation to political culture. Given the hostile 
attitude towards dissidence, many cannot openly 
state their views and have to take such a position. 
Being in power they undermine it from within.
The people of Kyrgyzstan witnessed how offi  cials and 
politicians discussed the HIPC Initiative and what their 
choice was. This is a particular case since it was about 
a principled and important issue therefore a personal 
choice has to be principled as well. As was expected 
the overwhelming majority of offi  cials waited till 
the master of the “White House” made his choice. 
The country was again persuaded that the Kyrgyz 
bureaucratic elite continues to serve individuals and 
their own selfi sh ends rather than the people. There 
were noteworthy exceptions and this gives hope 
that the authorities may have the people’s interests 
at heart. The whips within the government agencies 
depend on the position these opposition fi gures take.
Muratbek Imanaliev, President of the Institute for Public Policy 
ISSUES OF NATIONAL STATEHOOD IN CENTRAL ASIA
Whether the states of Central Asia have succeeded 
in becoming fully-fl edged or not is a debatable 
question, with ambiguous answers. Whether 
they will succeed is also a valid question. 
The search for historical and philosophical roots 
and bases for the formation of modern platforms of 
state organization in Central Asia is not particularly 
successful from the point of view that there is a need 
to look towards some other history, to appropriate 
other’s ideas of state organization - this is always as 
unstable as a sandcastle. Or the wandering reference 
point comes to rest upon myths and legends, which 
is also generally unreliable, since unconfi rmed by 
real historical facts. And since the textual element 
of historical background is “far from being perfect”, 
then attempts at inventing evidences of “who is more 
ancient and stronger” demonstrate serious deliberate 
distortions, which emerge in the process of the research 
activities of modern Central Asian historiographers. 
It is quite obvious that the work on the restoration of 
the history of the region’s people should continue, but 
it would be preferable to carry it out without political 
straining and fantasizing. There are no doubts that 
the ancestry of the present people of Central Asia, in 
various kaleidoscopic ethno-formats, participated in 
the creation of diff erent states, including great empires. 
First of all, this was a concerted eff ort and secondly, 
the historical memory of the modern people did not 
preserve the principles, parameters, and systems of 
state arrangement in the distant to more recent past. 
For instance, the history of the Kokand Khanate (from 
reasonably recent history) - is a common history of 
Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Kypchaks and other 
people of the region. All of these ethnicities, in one way 
or another, participated in the formation, development, 
and downfall of that state. However, the main meanings 
of the “Kokand state organization” were not only lost 
(a system of historical and communicative, social and 
cultural ties between the generations is destroyed), but 
also not recognized by the descendants of those who 
lived in that khanate ((the exception in this sense are only 
apologists of FANO (those who want to unite Fergana, 
Andijan, Namangan, and Osh into one state), but in the 
mosaic ideology of this so-called movement, religious 
motives nevertheless are stronger than statism)). 
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Bolsheviks founded the modern state organization in 
Central Asia; precisely it is the result of the implementation 
of Lenin’s national policy. It was the very communists 
of Russia who carried out a “national and territorial” 
delimitation in Central Asia that local people had never 
dreamt of. They have created various kinds and levels of 
autonomy, republics, drawn borders between republics 
(often arbitrarily), written constitutions, established 
authorities, legal and educational systems, etc. All of this 
was part of one big country called the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR), but the formal and legal 
basis of sovereignty of each of the union republics has 
created certain futurological administrative and political 
images in the structure of the political conscience of 
the residents of Central Asian republics. Communists 
have not only created republics with their governments, 
borders, fl ags, emblems, and other trappings, but in the 
end gave real independence to these republics. Hardly 
anyone will deny that Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, 
Leonid Kravchuk and other political fi gures of the USSR 
of the second half of 1980s were communists. What sort 
of communists they were is a diff erent issue. It was they 
(the list could be very long), who while fi ghting for power, 
destroyed the second world power and subsequently 
even did not manage to explain why they committed this 
act of state suicide. Later semi-literate pursuits seeking a 
retrospective understanding of the possibility of a return 
to the past were not necessary to anyone anymore. 
In  relation to the aforementioned, we should 
note that the Central Asian republics were not 
particularly thirsty for independence. Let  us recall 
at least the fact that the average fi gure of the 
referendum on preserving the USSR in March 1989 
was 73% in favor, whereas in Central Asia it was 95%. 
Therefore, based on other social, cultural, political, 
economic and other parameters, which formed 
during 150 years of being part of Russia and the USSR, 
it could be concluded that the following postulate 
was the sustainable paradigm of “independence” 
of Central Asians: “Sovereignty within the bounds 
of the Russian statehood.” Therefore, as a result of 
disintegration of the USSR it turned out that Central 
Asians were sort of “expelled” from the Union. So 
after the downfall of a huge country emerged the so-
called syndrome of “suddenly (without a struggle) 
acquired (“out of a clear blue sky”) independence.” 
Frankly  speaking,  during  the  initial years of 
independence, leaders of the newly emerged states of the 
region did not know what to do with that “independence”, 
where to start. From my point of view, the creation of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has saved 
Central Asians from many risks and problems, since, as I 
have  already mentioned the CIS is not an international 
organization, rather a regulated process of disintegration 
of the empire (as is well known, empires do not perish 
suddenly - this is a complex, protracted and painful 
process). The CIS taught the states of Central Asia a lot: 
building certain elements of the international and legal 
relations between each other (and not just through 
Moscow), forming relations with Russia (this was more 
than topical for each of the former Soviet republics, 
including the Baltic states), establishing relations with 
“strangers”, including former enemies and friends, etc. 
At present many politicians, diplomats, and experts talk 
about the need for reanimation of the CIS (it is totally 
unclear what they mean by the reanimation of the CIS), 
giving new impulses to the new development of the 
Commonwealth, etc. As I view it, the CIS, as it exists, has 
fulfi lled everything it could have. Everyone has departed 
peacefully and it is hardly possible to come together. 
The Commonwealth should have been preserved as a 
conferential intergovernmental community, modeled 
on the British Commonwealth, with a view of carrying 
out consultations on general issues of world order, 
security, continental economy and cooperation in 
the sphere of cultural and humanitarian relations. 
All the more, if even in Russia the ideas of “returning 
lost territories” are still enduring, then it is practically 
impossible - too many people and too many things 
have changed too much. There is no talk at all about the 
desire of the elite groups in the Central Asian states to 
restore the past, with the exception of some isolated, 
desperate exclamations of politicians and public fi gures. 
During the initial years of independence one could 
barely observe conceptual approaches to the issue of 
the formation and development of national statehood 
in the region. Outlines of the movement forward 
depended on individual qualities, experience, will and 
the worldview of one person who turned out to head a 
state. For instance, Saparmurad Niyazov came to power in 
Turkmenistan and the country slowly moved backwards 
to the Middle Ages; Askar Akaev was elected president in 
Kyrgyzstan and there emerged “an island of democracy.” 
However, as it seems to me, the inertia of Sovietness as 
a mode of organizing a state still remains preserved in 
the main, key elements, given the entire multi-vector 
development. In particular, the law as a regulator  of 
all relations in all states of Central Asia remains a 
Soviet model with insignifi cant innovative changes. 
The only diff erence is that in Turkmenistan - there is an 
epoch of Stalinism, in Kyrgyzstan - Brezhnevism. The state 
management has virtually not changed: the same staff  
of the Central Committee with functional and sectoral 
departments (Administration of the President), the 
same Cabinet staff , helpless ministers, the judiciary as a 
branch of the executive, fi rst secretaries of provincial and 
regional committees (provincial and regional governors) 
who are accountable to, and depend on, the President 
(Secretary General or First Secretary). A set of functions, 
the character of activities, the style of leadership, a vertical 
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line of mutual responsibility remains the same - Soviet. 
Elections are held according to the Stalinist scheme 
- “elections are won by those who count, and not by 
those who get more votes.” The structural development 
of the economy cannot even be observed in Kazakhstan, 
although there were more than enough talks and projects. 
Public relations and civil society, with the exception of 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, remain virtually unchanged. 
Worse than that, given all the positive advances in the 
development of civil society in the latter two states, 
there is a process of dehumanization of public relations, 
accompanied by a criminalization of everything and 
everyone. Rigid authoritarian systems in conforming 
to the latter observation are not an exception. 
Another seemingly positive advance towards the 
development of privatization and the stimulation of 
private entrepreneurship exists as a process of transfer of 
property from hand to hand, along with the changes in the 
political situation coupled with outrageous corruption. 
And no businessman, even among oligarchs close to 
government agencies, could not boast that his offi  cially 
registered property could be transferred to his children. 
Bureaucracy, even trained in the West, is busy with 
serving itself, including the so-called protection racket. 
At present, bureaucracy in the states of Central Asia 
could be viewed as a reformed Soviet nomenclature 
class. A distinguishing feature of the modern 
bureaucracy in the Central Asian states is that it has 
merged with business and criminal groups. Everything 
that is happening in the states of the region, including 
the issues of state formation, should not be viewed as 
a movement towards development and the approach 
to international standards (for instance, European). To 
a greater extent this is a regeneration of the Soviet on 
the inertial basis, i.e. the so-called post-Communism in 
the post-Soviet area. Post-Communism forms its own set 
of values - a cross-breed of Sovietness, Islamism and, as 
D. Furman qualifi ed it, imitational democracy. How will 
post-Communism infl uence the formation of the ideas 
of national statehood and particularly of state building? 
It will have an infl uence, but there is always a choice. 
It is diffi  cult to deny a banal statement - there is a 
need for a concept of the country’s development, 
on the basis of which it is possible to build all 
necessary constructions for creation of a state. 
But to formulate such a concept is not diffi  cult if the 
country has a consolidated elite, which is guided by a 
certain Idea. It should be acknowledged that Kyrgyzstan 
so far, regrettably, does not have such a thing. 
For  instance,  in  Uzbekistan  they  have  developed 
a  concept of “The Great State of Uzbekistan” 
(buiukdavletism). There are no doubts that it is 
possible to fi nd a great number of defects and to 
suspect Uzbek ideologists of an attempt to exhume 
old ideologies of statehood from Uzbek bourgeois 
nationalists of the beginning of the XX century. 
Nevertheless, the concept exists and was adopted, if 
not by the entire population, then at any case, by a 
large segment of the Uzbek public and its elite groups. 
Kazakhstan, by building up its way according to the 
ideas of the “2030 Program”, later having used the 
serendipitous oil and gas fortune, has adjusted the 
qualitative parameters of the concept by transforming 
it into an idea to join the 50 most competitive states. 
A bright idea, which provided the basis for the 
construction of the famous multi-vector diplomacy. 
There is also the concept of the “permanent 
neutrality of Turkmenistan”, which formed the 
basis of the country’s energetic independence. 
The concept of Tajikistan’s development is sectorally 
outlined. An important element in this is the 
understanding of the fact that the Tajik state is viewed 
as “a jointing area” between the Turkic-speaking and 
Persian-speaking worlds. And the transformation of the 
situation in Afghanistan after 2001 has strengthened 
positions of Tajikistan in the Central Asian international 
arena and opened new possibilities and prospects. 
It is absolutely clear that these concepts (or rather, 
conceptual approaches) are far from being perfect, and 
it will take a protracted journey along a thorny path in 
order to attain the Idea, which will be sustainable for the 
required period of development and form the basis of 
state building. However, we should acknowledge that 
our neighbors already have the apparent concepts of 
a country’s development, which is widely and futilely 
discussed in Kyrgyzstan. Last year a special commission 
was set up in Bishkek, tasked with development of the 
national ideology, but in the end there was a “great cry 
and little wool.” I could be mistaken, but it seems to 
me that the idea of the “creation of a nation” or more 
extensively put, the “creation of people” should form 
the basis of our national concept of development. 
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WHAT HAMPERS ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC?
Rafkat Khasanov, Executive Director of “Investment Round Table” Public Union 
WHAT HAMPERS ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC?
In one of the reports devoted to the development 
of private sector in Kyrgyzstan[1], it was said that 
the Kyrgyz Republic encountered some serious 
obstacles to economic development.  It was pointed 
out that one of the deepest economic crises in world 
history has occurred in Kyrgyzstan. The crisis resulted 
from persistent problems caused by unfavorable 
physical and economic peculiarities such as: 
• Relatively small internal market 
• Distant geographical location 
(the lack of access to sea ports) 
• Relatively poor mineral resources 
It should be noted that only Kyrgyzstan (and, 
probably, Tajikistan) has all these three peculiarities. 
It does not explain why the Kyrgyz Republic, which 
had the same problems in mid-1990’s, surpassed its 
neighbors in levels of economic growth, or why these 
levels decreased (in relation to its neighbors) only in 
2002 (see Chart 1). The level of economic growth during 
the period between 1995 and 2001 averaged 5,5 %, 
while between 2002 and 2006 it made up only 3,1 %. 
Chart 1. GDP growth (1995-2006) 
Source: http://www.cisstat.com/, author’s calculations. 
The latest research studies, conducted by 
international fi nancial institutions[2], show that 
the main obstacle to the economic growth is the 
trade barrier that the Kyrgyz Republic experiences 
in its borders. The Chart 2, particularly, shows 
that trade barriers in neighboring countries are 
more considerable than in the Kyrgyz Republic. 
 A report presented at the conference “Central Asia in 2007: Dynamics of Change 
and Development”, organized by the Institute for Public Policy on 2 March 2007. 
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WHAT HAMPERS ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC?
Chart 2. Trade barriers related to trade policies 
Source: ADB, See reference 2
Taking into consideration that the country is signifi cantly 
dependent upon external economic relations, these 
barriers could be noted as having negative eff ect upon 
the economic growth in the Kyrgyz Republic. According 
to the authors of the abovementioned reports, the 
removal of trade barriers will increase the real GDP 
within 10 years to 50-55 percent or 4, 2-4, 5 % per year 
as compared to the basic scenario. It should be noted 
that the increase of economic growth to 4 or more 
percent is seen as the signifi cant increase, which can 
imply a stable economic growth. At the same time, 
this increase of potential economic growth creates a 
legitimate question: does it mean that the development 
of Kyrgyzstan is impossible without solving the problems 
with trade cooperation? Research studies, conducted 
by our institution[3], have shown that the removal 
of trade barriers will lead to the following results: 
• The growth of the country’s 
economy and budget incomes 
• Strengthening of integration trends 
• More balanced economic growth, 
which exerts a special infl uence upon the 
development of relatively poor economic sectors 
• Stimulates an export of priority industries 
However, these studies have also shown that the 
economic growth in this case will increase moderately 
or to 2, 3 % per year. More importantly, the eff ect 
from the removal of trade barriers will have a fading 
character. It means that the economic growth is 
determined not only by economic surrounding, but 
also by internal factors and processes of development 
that the economy of Kyrgyzstan is undergoing. 
Table 1 shows that the economy of Kyrgyzstan, generally, 
has been adequately responding to the increasing 
demand from trading partners during the period 
between 2002 and 2006. Based on Kyrgyzstan’s export 
shares, GDP Partners growth averaged 6, 1 %, while 
Kyrgyzstan’s export growth averaged 10, 2 %, which is 
twice as much as its GDP growth. However, it did not 
aff ect adequately upon the growth rate in Kyrgyzstan, 
which made up only 3,1  % . This is due to the fact that 
signifi cant portion of income goes to purchasing import 
products. Thus, the growth of import averaged 17 %, 
while the defi cit of trade balance increased from 48,9 
million dollars in 2002 to 1135,2 million[4]  in 2006.
Table 1. The dynamics of external demand
  
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Средний
Average 
growth of 
GDP Partners
4.5 6,3 7,0 6,5 6 6,1
Export 2.0 18,5 24,2 -6,4 15,9 10.2
Kyrgyzstan: 
GDP Growth 
Rate   
0 6,7 7,0 -0,6 2,7 3,1
Source: NSC and author’s calculations 
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WHAT HAMPERS ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC?
Table 2 shows that there is a stable internal demand 
in Kyrgyzstan, which is signifi cantly ensured at 
the expense of incoming transfers and other 
unaccounted receipts[5].  Within 5 years the number 
of transfers and unaccounted receipts has increased 
unprecedented from 6 % of GDP to 28 % of GDP. 
Table 2. Transfers and Unaccounted receipts (in million dollars) 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Transfers and 
Unaccounted 
receipts
96,9 221,2 299,4 635,3 799,0
Including 
current transfers 
88.4 111.7 208.5 332.1 464.9
Growth Rate  228,3 135,4 212,2 125,8
The relation “ 
transfers and 
unaccounted 
receipts “ to GDP
6,0 11,5 13,5 26,0 28,4
Source: NSC and author’s calculations 
This fl ow of money to the economy of Kyrgyzstan 
is leading towards signifi cant increase of individual 
consumption, the growth rate of which averaged 7, 5 % 
(Table 3). In turn, such growth of individual consumption 
leads to the increase of service sector in the Kyrgyz 
Republic, and, particularly, of trade and public nutrition. 
Table 3. Internal Demand   
2001-2005average growth rate
GDP 3,1
Internal Demand 5,1
Expenses for ultimate consumption 6,6
Expenses of individual consumption 7,5
Gross savings -2,5
Source: NSC and author’s calculations 
The following graph shows trade and public 
nutrition as the main sectors, which has been 
ensuring the GDP growth in the last years. 
Chart 4. Contribution of specifi c sectors to read GDP growth, 2001-2006 
Source: NSC and author’s calculations 
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WHAT HAMPERS ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC?
According to this data, the economy of Kyrgyzstan has 
signifi cant internal and external demand. However, the 
economy does not respond quite adequately to this 
demand. One can be questioned in this context as to 
why having both unfavorable physical and economic 
peculiarities and more favorable signs from demand 
the economy of Kyrgyzstan is developing (in the last 5 
years) according to the rate 1,5 times lower than that 
of the previous fi ve-year period. The data provided 
above (Table 3) shows that the gross saving has been 
signifi cantly decreasing over a long period of time. 
At the same time, as shown in the Table 5, the rate of 
savings is 1,5 times lower than that of our neighbors.
Table 5. The Rate of Savings
2004 2005
Kazakhstan 25,1 24,8 
Uzbekistan 22,1 23,1 
Kyrgyzstan 14,8 14,5 
Russia 20,8 20,9 
Source: ADB 
Many studies focus on the following features when 
describing the investment climate in the Kyrgyz Republic. 
• Imperfect Legislation (wide 
competencies of the corresponding 
agencies, which put unmotivated demands) 
• Superfl uity (conducting any type of business 
requires obtaining a document or conciliatory visa, 
without which the business is considered as illegal); 
• Increasing direct and 
indirect costs in conducting business; 
• Provoking corruption; 
• Entrepreneurs prefer to go into 
“shadow” business, than being confronted 
with numerous bureaucratic problems. 
• The presence of a signifi cant 
number of contradictory acts, reference 
rules and distortion of acts of lower level. 
The following graphs serve as the proof for these 
statements. The Chart 6 shows that according to various 
indicators, the system of regulation in the Kyrgyz 
Republic is far from the best indicators of the world. 
Chart 5. The Level of Regulation in Kyrgyzstan and the World 
Source: www.doingbusiness.org 
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WHAT HAMPERS ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC?
It is necessary to start activities on improving the 
investment climate in the Kyrgyz Republic and 
it should go on in the following directions[6]: 
• Opening up the business 
(State Registration of Enterprises); 
• Permissions for conducting 
special types of activities (licensing); 
• Setting obligatory state requirements 
and conditions for allowing the products and 
services in the market (technical regulation); 
• Permissions and coordination from the state 
agencies (permission to use the land, taking the lands 
out, permission to throw polluting materials etc.); 
• Creation of stable and predictable legislation; 
• Conducting audits 
• Ensuring the property rights 
• Improving the institutions of stock market 
• Establishing institutions responsible 
for attracting and advancing the investments 
In general, the following should be noted: the improvement 
of the regulatory system can signifi cantly improve the 
situation in the country. EBRD’s research, which studied 
the infl uence of economic factors on the growth of the 
economy, is the example for this. Even insignifi cant 
improvement of the investment climate can seriously 
increase the economic growth, as shown in the Table 6. 
Table 6. The main components of improving the investment climate in the Kyrgyz Republic.   
The Potential for Growth 
Indicator The Value of 
Indicator as of 2005 
Contribution to GDP 
in 2005 
Initial Data Contribution to GDP 
in  % 
Indicator of Reforms 
(average assessment 
of EBRD reforms) 
2,92 0 3,25 1,3% 
Fiscal defi cit (Defi cit 
of budget in relation 
to GDP) 
2,2 +0,6 2,2 0,6% 
The increase of 
external demand  
(average growth rate 
of GDP partners) 
5,2 -0,1 7 0,6% 
Balance of Oil Trade 
(in relation to GDP) 
-0,08 -0,05   
The overall 
contribution of 
factors 
 +0,45  + 2,5 
Notes:
[1] ADB Report on development of private 
sector in KR: Problems and  choices. ADB 2007. 
[2] ADB report on Central Asia. How to increase benefi ts 
from trade by regional cooperation in the sphere of trade 
policy, transport and customs transit. ADB 2006. Report 
on human development in Central Asia. UNDP 2005. 
[3] “Obstacles on the trade path of Kyrgyzstan in 
the region of Central (Middle) Asia”, Bishkek 2006. 
[4] Data of the payment balance of KR for 2002., 
NBKR (The National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic). 2007. 
Data of express information of NSC for January 2007. 
[5] In the balance of payment for 9 months of 2006 the line 
“mistakes and omissions” compose 211,2 million dollars. In 
essence, this number is equal to the unfi nished fi nancing of trade 
balance and, thus, can be considered as unaccounted receipts. 
[6] Further reforms on these directions are considered 
in detail in the following publications (in development 
of which the author took direct participation). 
Kyrgyzstan on the new stage of 
development, UNDP, Bishkek, 2005 
Policy documents (developed by IRT with support of 
USAID, Bishkek, 2006 http://www.investment.kg/ ): 1) 
Conditions of regulatory and permitory processes: courses of 
worsening of the business climate and recommendations on 
its improvement; 2) Reasons of the increase of the number 
of checks of business activity by governmental bodies, 
corruption in controlling bodies and recommendations 
on the improvement of administration and decreasing of 
corruption; 3) Problems of protection of private property and 
recommendations on providing guarantees and means of 
protection of immunity; 4) Problems of lack of transparency 
of the legislative process and ineff ective execution of laws. 
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Sergei Sabko, Director General, “Consultant” Company 
TAX REFORMS: MYTHS AND REALITY
Right now a key issue for the country is working out 
a unanimously suitable edition of the Constitution 
of Kyrgyzstan. Indeed, the document is important 
because it defi nes the basic parameters of the 
legal fi eld for citizens of the country. Certainly 
Kyrgyzstanis are not indiff erent to which system 
they live in: totalitarian, authoritarian or democratic. 
The tax code is a document that plays almost as 
important a role as the Constitution, because it 
defi nes the basic parameters of the legal fi eld for 
businesses. The importance of the tax code can be 
proved with historical examples in the formation of 
European democracies, which emerged in the struggle 
to limit the powers of the monarchy in establishing 
and collecting taxes. In this regard, it is quite relevant 
to talk about the form of tax regime in Kyrgyzstan. 
A tax regime, based on the principle of a partnership of 
business and the state, could be called a democratic tax 
regime. And a tax regime in which tax payers have no 
rights, the point of view of the state is the only correct 
one and there is a special body to control and suppress 
tax payers, could be called a totalitarian tax regime. 
The current edition of the tax code here (in the classifi cation 
mentioned above) represents an authoritarian type of 
tax regime. The following norms prove such a notion: 
Division of powers 
There is no division of powers, which is one 
of the elements of a constitutional state. The 
executive branch of power actively interferes with 
the activities of the legislative branch of power. 
So part 1 of article 5 of the current tax code establishes the 
direct restriction on the legislation activity of parliament: 
Article 5 of the tax code of Kyrgyz Republic: 
“Article 5. Order of introduction of amendments to the tax 
code 
1. All projects of amendments to the tax code are subject to 
initial expert evaluation of the Ministry of Finance of Kyrgyz 
Republic prior to their consideration by the government 
and the parliament of Kyrgyz Republic. 
Bills about introduction or abolition of taxes, exemption 
from taxes, are adopted only by approbation of government 
of Kyrgyz Republic.” 
It raises a lot of questions. Why does legislative 
work in taxation need the approbation of the 
government? What is the reason for such a demand? 
The reasons given by offi  cials are interesting: they say that 
if parliament adopts amendments to taxation, in the long 
run it will impact upon the state’s budget. If this is the case, 
the government cannot fulfi ll the budget. There are no 
other reasons. The whole issue rests on budget fulfi llment. 
Their anxieties have no grounds however, because 
regarding taxes there is a norm according to which 
all amendments come into eff ect only starting the 
next year. It secures the invariability of the budget 
task of the government, and logically, the reasons 
the government give that it would be complicated 
to fulfi ll the budget (should legislators interfere in 
tax legislation) are artifi cial, strained and groundless. 
In general, as theory of state suggests, only the 
state that performs its powers under clear division 
of powers (legislative, executive and judicial) 
can be called constitutional. Any limitation of 
any branch of power means that the state is 
not constitutional. Draw your own conclusions. 
Presumption of innocence 
In the current edition of the tax code there is no concept of 
presumption of innocence or the honesty of the taxpayer. 
In general, those terms are not equal. But right now we 
are not interested in details. The issue is in the elementary 
mechanisms of the protection of a taxpayer’s rights. 
Since tax legislation contains mechanisms of coercion 
towards the taxpayer, such as required tax checkups 
and required reporting, there is a need to introduce 
the presumption of innocence into tax legislation. 
At the present moment tax offi  cers directly abuse 
their positions in the process of tax checkups, and 
produce arbitrary extra charges that are not backed 
up by calculations or evidence. The taxpayer is initially 
assumed guilty and later, forced to prove innocence. 
Besides, taxpayers who are charged with extra 
fees, often wrongfully, for amounts exceeding 500 
thousand soms, have criminal cases instituted against 
them. At the same time, criminal cases are instituted 
prior to the announcement of decisions on tax 
disputes in economic panels, in accordance with a 
civil process. It is lawlessness under visible legality! 
The presumption of innocence of the taxpayer 
should contain the norm according to which it 
is prohibited to institute a criminal case prior 
to the announcement of the decision of the 
economic panel in accordance with civil process. 
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Interpretation of dispute issues 
The executive branch of power is entitled to the 
right to interpret the norms of the tax code, which 
contradicts the Constitution that defi nes also the order 
of interpretation (explanation.) According to the Law 
on normative legal acts, the body that approves the 
law is entitled to the right to interpret or explain norms. 
Article 50 of the Law about normative legal acts: 
«VII. Interpretation (explanation) of normative legal acts 
Article 50. In case of vagueness of normative legal acts, 
wrong or contradictory practice of their application by 
the legislative body, which adopted relevant act, gives 
necessary explanation of its norms, drawn up in a special act. 
    
Article 51 of the Law about normative legal acts of Kyrgyz 
Republic: 
“According to article 58 of the Constitution of Kyrgyz 
Republic the parliament gives offi  cial interpretation of 
adopted normative acts.” 
Article 58 of the Constitution of Kyrgyz Constitution: 
“Article 58. 
1. Under parliament’s jurisdiction are: 
1) Adoption of the Constitution, introduction of 
amendments and additions to current Constitution, and 
also adoption of the new edition of the Constitution in 
accordance with order given in current Constitution; 
2) adoption of laws; 
3) offi  cial interpretation of the Constitution and adopted 
laws; ...” 
It seems that it is written in clear and plain language that 
the parliament gives the offi  cial interpretation of adopted 
laws. At the same time the title of chapter VII equates 
the meaning of terms “interpretation” and “explanation”. 
However, according to article 18-1 of the tax code, 
the right for explanation is given to the Ministry 
of Finance, i.e. to the executive branch of power, 
which contradicts the Law on normative legal acts. 
“Article 18-1. Explanation of norms of the tax code of Kyrgyz 
Republic 
Ministry of Finance is entitled the right to explain norms of 
the tax code of Kyrgyz Republic...” 
Tax inspections 
The Tax Service is entitled to the right to conduct 
tax inspections. Regular documentary tax 
inspections are conducted once per year, cross-
inspections - with no frequency limitation. 
At the present moment tax checkups are not an 
instrument with which the state budget can be 
recharged. In reality, as a result of tax checkups the 
budget gets only 3 percent of all tax collections. At the 
same time, a large part of tax collection goes to the 
maintenance of staff  inspectors of external checkups. 
According to Kyrgyz businesses and foreign experts, 
including those of the World Bank, the mechanism 
of tax checkups is designed only for the staff  of 
the Tax Service to charge money and exactions. 
On average, a tax inspection costs about $400 for a 
business, in this a case bribe to the tax inspector is implied. 
As expert research showed, in civilized countries 
tax checkups are applied only if there are grounds 
to suspect a taxpayer of dishonest tax payment. 
Regarding other taxpayers there is the small but very 
professional staff  of the Tax Service, which performs work 
of a mainly analytical character. Such a system should 
certainly provide very strict sanctions, including criminal 
responsibility, towards those people who evade taxes. 
Tax rates 
Kyrgyzstan has very high tax rates. At the present 
moment, VAT rate, including VAT for import is fi xed at 20 
percent in Kyrgyzstan. In Kazakhstan this rate amounts 
to 14 percent. There is no sense and economic logic to 
this number. Any business making decisions on where 
to import goods will choose Kazakhstan because 
the losses for VAT on import will be signifi cantly less. 
That is why, even where there are markets in 
Kyrgyzstan, it is more profi table to export goods 
to Kazakhstan and then using illegal import 
(smuggling) bring them back to Kyrgyzstan. 
If we do not count our offi  cials silly, thanks to whom 
such wild ratios on taxes were fi xed (compared with 
our neighbors) we have to acknowledge that there 
should be sense in constructing such a system. 
Is there any sense in increasing smuggling? Indeed, 
there is sense for customs offi  cials, who take the bribes. 
The more smuggling, the better it is for customs offi  cials. 
The same can also be said of taxes. The higher the tax 
rate, the more diffi  cult they are to pay, and logically more 
businesses are forced to operate in the shadow economy. 
According to offi  cial statistics, tax at present amounts 
to 20 percent towards the GDP of the country. However, 
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any business will say that it is a fi ction and should one 
pay everything provided by tax legislation then the 
real tax burden on separate kinds of businesses would 
amount to up to 50 percent from taxpayer profi t. 
There is one simple conclusion: at the level of statistics it is 
visible that not every taxpayer pays taxes. If all taxpayers 
have been paying taxes, tax collection would amount 
to 50 percent from GDP, but not 20 percent as it is now. 
The conclusion is that tax rates in Kyrgyzstan are 
artifi cially overstated. It is not done accidentally or 
without thinking. It is done to chase businesses out of the 
legal fi eld. A business that is chased out of the legal fi eld 
is forced to solve problems using corruption. Thus, the 
tax system in Kyrgyzstan is worked out and supported 
in such a way by offi  cials that bribe takers get serious 
shadow fi nancial revenue besides their budget salary. 
It is worth adding that the issue of tax rates should 
be considered at the level both of tax rates and 
other elements applied to calculate the amount of 
tax due, including amounts of non-taxable income. 
For example, in the U.S. the maximum rate for income tax 
amounts to 35 percent, and in Kyrgyzstan this rate is 10 
percent. And this case is used by unprincipled offi  cials as 
evidence of acceptable tax rates in Kyrgyzstan. However, 
if we take into account the amount of non-taxable 
income, then the picture dramatically changes. The non-
taxable income amount is $200 in Kyrgyzstan, whereas in 
the U.S. the amount is $7000. Impressive? It means that 
the U.S. citizen who has an income of $7000 does not pay 
income tax at all, and at the same time, a Kyrgyz citizen 
should pay income tax of about $620 from this amount. 
The complex features evident in a lack of clearly 
formulated and protected rights of tax payers, the 
lack of real division of powers, lawlessness manifested 
in tax checkups and high tax rates mean that 
there is an authoritarian tax system in Kyrgyzstan. 
We are not a totalitarian tax system for any one 
reason. A body of pressure in the form of the Tax 
Service is relatively loyal to non-payers, which allows 
the taxpayers to “solve problems” in almost any 
situation, even in the case of persistent tax evasion. 
Tax reform: myths and reality 
At the beginning of 2004, relevant bodies started 
work on a new edition of the tax code. The authorities 
set up a state commission and expert group on 
developing the new edition. At the same time it was 
expected that the state commission would equip the 
expert group with a concept, or at least a vision, of 
the common outlines of the new tax code, which the 
expert group would realize in articles of the tax code. 
But such cooperation did not happen from the very 
beginning. Co-chairmen of the state commission were 
saying good words on the new approaches to taxation, 
that Kyrgyzstan is a state with a service economy, about 
the necessity to take into account the realities of tax 
systems in neighboring states, and about the partnership 
of the government and society in the tax sphere, etc. 
However, those words did not refl ect on the eff orts of the 
expert group. Composed of former and current offi  cials 
of the Ministry of Finance and the State Tax Inspection, 
the expert group started its work. After some time, a 
discouraged public had the chance to see the outlines 
of the future document, which provided following: 
a) seizure of property without court 
decision (that contradicts the Constitution), 
b) general registration in the Tax Service of everyone, 
including foreign citizens, who have bank accounts, 
c) additional types of checkups, such as raids, 
chronometry, cameral checkups and monitoring, 
d) all disputed issues in tax legislation 
are solved by the Ministry of Finance, 
e) there is a “tax post” introduced which does 
not exists in the current edition, where a tax 
inspector resides at the taxpayers’ place for 
an indefi nite time, with all the consequences, 
f ) voluntary payment of tax is destroyed. It means 
that all businesses in Kyrgyzstan’s markets should 
provide reports to the Tax Service from now on, 
j) in the same text of the project, certain non-market 
taxes were introduced: “road tax” and “deductions for the 
prevention of emergency situations,” the abolition of which 
was promised to businesses since the end of XX century. 
It became clear that with the adoption of such a 
tax code, legal businesses will most likely disappear 
from Kyrgyzstan. And only those businesses will 
work whom the Tax Service will allow. It is not up for 
discussion: the Tax Service will get marvelous powers. 
From this very moment, professionals who know 
tax legislation realized the greatness of the idea of 
the Ministry of Finance to create a totalitarian tax 
system in Kyrgyzstan. It became immediately clear 
that it is the last line. If one is defeated in this “battle”, 
there will not be any opportunity for revenge. 
So, businesses decided to work out their own alternative 
edition of the tax code. This version was worked 
out and even submitted to parliament by one MP. 
-20-
CHALLENGES OF DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE STATE POLICY ON WATER 
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 
K
Y
R
G
Y
ZS
TA
N
 B
R
IE
F 
  I
ss
ue
 �
 9
Taxes proposed by business community: 
1. Profi ts tax 
2. VAT 
3. Excise tax 
4. Income tax 
5. Social tax 
6. Land tax 
7. Property tax 
8. Retail tax 
9. Tax from natural resources users  
The system proposed by the business community does 
not pretend to be original. There are almost the same taxes 
as in the governmental version of the tax code; excluding 
road tax and deductions for the prevention of emergency 
situations (those two taxes are not listed in the edition 
proposed by the business community.) At the same 
time there are substantial diff erences regarding VAT and 
Social tax.  The VAT rate for the services sector amounts 
to 10 percent, for other sectors of activity it is 15 percent. 
Regarding social tax, which was off ered by the business 
community instead of a deduction for state social 
insurance, the sources of tax are the same as they were 
in deduction; specifi cally, the salary of employees and 
the expenses of employers. At the same time, tax rates 
are signifi cantly changed, which amount to 15 percent 
according to the following formula 15%=8%+7%. 8 
percent is deducted from the employee’s salary, i.e. the 
rate remains the same, and employer pays 7 percent from 
salary fund, instead of 21 percent at the present moment. 
VAT rates (10 and 15 percent) and Social tax (15 
percent) are fi xed at relatively high levels. The level 
was calculated from numerous meetings with business 
representatives. Such rates are the highest threshold 
under which businesses can still pay taxes. If the rates 
are higher, businesses would tend to go black, i.e. under 
the protection of corrupted offi  cials of the Tax Service. 
There is one more important element. Tax payment is 
always a painful process. And resorting to a singularly 
oppressive body in the form of the Tax Service and 
Financial Police has never had the desired results 
anywhere in the world. It is necessary to achieve consensus 
within society, a certain type of public agreement in 
which the state takes responsibility for setting a SOUND 
tax policy, and the society AGREES to pay taxes. When 
society refuses to pay taxes, no repression will help. 
Businesses will work either in the shadow or abroad. 
On the other hand, the rationality of taxes is dictated 
by the necessary public expenses of the state, such as 
the expenses for defense, public security, law and order, 
medicine, education and others. And that is right. Logically, 
a public agreement (the tax code) between society and 
state on taxes should contain such a list of taxes and rates 
that are low enough for the possibility to develop and 
pay taxes, while at the same time being high enough to 
allow the state budget to be formed in suffi  cient volume. 
Right now politicians do not care about the tax 
code. In fact, spring 2007 demonstrated an annual 
intensifi cation of political health of Kyrgyzstan (which 
has become normal). Nevertheless, the long drawn-
out tax reform should be concluded. We hope that the 
legislators will not treat the adoption of the new edition 
of the tax code as being of secondary importance.
Round table summary
CHALLENGES OF DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE STATE POLICY ON WATER 
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 
On 28 March 2007 the Institute for Public Policy 
hosted a round table “Challenges of developing 
eff ective state policy on water resources management”, 
which brought together experts from state institutions, 
scientifi c centers and independent experts dealing 
with water and water power resources. The event was 
moderated by Muratbek Imanaliev, President of the 
Institute for Public Policy. The discussion was a follow-up 
of 15 December 2006 round table on “Water resources 
management in Kyrgyzstan: price and possible scenarios.” 
In his introduction speech President of the Institute 
for Public Policy Muratbek Imanaliev stated that absence 
of a well-shaped national interest in management of the 
country’s water resources remains the main unresolved 
issue. It is only possible to build eff ective policy on 
utilization and management of water resources if there 
is a clear outline of role water plays in our country.
The round table participants concluded that water 
should be recognized as a national wealth of Kyrgyzstan, 
which should play a key role in economic development and 
provision of security of the country. This principle must be 
a guide in developing and implementing a specifi c water 
policy, tailored both domestically and internationally.
Regarding the issue of joint use of water resources 
with Central Asian countries, round table participants 
noted that Kyrgyzstan should build its policy based on 
two principles: the principle of integration of Central 
Asian states and the principle of inter-industrial balance 
of interests. Water should serve to promote integration 
and peaceful mutually benefi cial cooperation between 
countries of the region. It is in Kyrgyzstan’s interests to 
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consider cooperation on water resources in a wider context, 
along with issues of energy, transport, trade and others.
Participants identifi ed several priorities that must be 
considered during implementation of the state water 
policy. First of all, domestic consumption of water must 
increase and be met. Today less than 15% out of 45 
billion cubic meters of water fl owing on the territory 
of Kyrgyzstan is used within the country. To develop 
economy, state should increase water consumption in 
industry, utilities and other sphere at least four times.
Secondly, government should adequately assess its 
possibilities in regional cooperation on water policy. 
As experts stated, development of international 
agreements and contracts on water issues should 
be guided by a balanced approach directed on 
protection of national interests of the Kyrgyz Republic 
while respecting interests of downstream countries. 
Certain confl ict of interests on water use could 
be observed between Kyrgyzstan and downstream 
countries today. It is in the interests of all states to 
fi nd mutually acceptable and benefi cial method of 
joint water usage. As stated earlier, one of the options 
is to consider the issue of water in the package with 
other issues, i.e., inter-sectoral balance of interests.
Regarding specifi c measures on developing strategy 
on trans-border water resources management, Director 
of the Institute for Water Issues and Power of the National 
Academy of Science of the Kyrgyz Republic, Duishen 
Mamatkanov proposed three points. First of all, it is 
necessary to reconsider existing system of water division 
between Central Asian states inherited from the Soviet 
Union. Around 30 billion of cubic meters of water are 
formed on the territory of Kyrgyzstan but only 4 billion 
are used by the country, which is insuffi  cient for domestic 
consumption. More than that, Kyrgyzstan has area of 
more than 1 million hectares which could be potentially 
turned into arable land. Secondly, it is vital to determine 
and recognize water as a commodity and charge fee both 
from internal and external consumers to cover expenses 
on strengthening river banks, making prognosis and 
conducting other regular activities. Thirdly, it is necessary 
to agree with neighboring countries that they provide 
compensation for expenses incurred by Kyrgyzstan for 
maintaining irrigation infrastructure on Toktogul cascade. 
A number of participants expressed their opinion 
that legal framework regulating water issues within the 
country as well as joint water usage with neighbors needs 
to be clarifi ed. Today a large number of legal acts exist that 
duplicate each other, some are not implemented partially, 
some - completely, and they might need to be cancelled. 
The round table participants also discussed a 
suggestion to establish an International Water Academy 
in Bishkek. The Academy would provide scientifi c, 
academic and analytical foundation covering all areas/
sectors related to water usage. In particular, such an 
institution would train professional staff  needed in 
water industry, provide relevant basis for research, serve 
as a platform for experts and politicians to discuss vital 
policy issues on water. As Muratbek Imanaliev noted, 
water is the main component of state development in 
Kyrgyzstan, and water policy should be considered as 
an essential part of a general state development policy. 
Farkhod Tolipov, Kandidat politicheskih nauk, Associate Professor of the Department of 
Political Science, National University of Uzbekistan
GEOPOLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
IN CENTRAL ASIA
Regional integrationism along with such phenomena 
as dialogue between civilizations and globalism are the 
three main foundations upon which a new systemic 
construction of international relations is being built at 
present. In this context there is a certain modality of 
collective actions on the international scene.  This is 
the conceptual and practical imperative, the challenge 
faced by the states of the international community. 
This challenge is of particular urgency for the so-
called new independent states of Central Asia, which 
emerged from the post-Soviet area who recently 
marked the fi fteenth anniversary of their independence. 
The issue of national and regional identity is a very 
important issue for the people of the Central Asian 
region. When apologists of the economic determinism 
of regional integration advance their arguments in order 
to prove the failure, or premature, integration of Central 
Asian states (in view of their economic diff erences) they 
certainly do not pay attention to one fundamental fact: 
that their rationalism of economic conditionality to 
integration is applicable to the case of full-fl edged state 
formations, of pre-industrial and industrial epochs. In 
our case, given the universal tendency towards a 
regionalization of international relations, there is an 
incompleteness to the process of political cartography 
in Central Asia. There is an insurmountable obstacle 
to its completion, which was historically formed by 
Paper delivered at the conference “Central Asia in 2007: Dynamics of Change 
and Development”, organized by the Institute for Public Policy on 2 March 2007.
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a transborder way of life for the inhabitants there, 
for whom national identity does not conform to 
the imposed international borders. But there is 
also an economic irrationality to delimitation. 
Waves of integration and disintegration 
colliding with each other create such complex 
geo-socio-cultural and political issues of 
regional development, that it is diffi  cult to see 
the distinction between national and regional. 
However, at present after 15 years of independence 
declared in December 1991 by fi ve Central Asian states 
(in response to the creation of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States by three Slavic states) the course for 
integration has become locked. The paradox of Central 
Asia lies in its national-regional dualism. It seems that in 
many respects it has caused the present ad-hoc situation, 
so to speak, in the process of regional integration. Indeed, 
this phenomenon of dualism has to a certain degree led 
to an inadequate understanding of national interests. 
Central Asian states and their leaders have become 
entangled in the development of regional strategy.
There are both objective and subjective elements 
in the current situation in the region. The formation of 
national statehood constitutes the objective factor. 
The creation of a new statehood with all it involves, 
including the accumulation of experience in conducting 
domestic and foreign policy, and integration into 
the world community, are unprecedented tasks. 
They have basically become an end in themselves 
and a sense of self-worth for all post-Soviet states.
The character and peculiarities of political 
leadership in these countries constitute the subjective 
factors. Lack of will and even loyalty to the idea of 
integration (what in English literature is referred to as 
“commitment”) has inhibited this process. The same 
idea could translate to the popular idea of the existence 
of a mythical competition between the leaders of 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for leadership in the region. 
The increased threat of terrorism and the repeated 
excursions of terrorists from one Central Asian state to 
another, alongside other security threats, have sowed 
distrust and accusations among these states. Thus 
the mining in certain sections of Uzbekistan’s border 
with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and the introduction 
of a visa policy with the neighboring states totally 
contradicts the aim of integration set out in 1991. 
Common security challenges in all fi ve states of the 
region have caused fi ve independent national responses 
instead of one unifi ed response, which has not led to 
strengthening of either regional or national security at all.
Besides, a delay in the integration process was met by the 
inadequate intervention by geopolitical elements. Non-
self-suffi  ciency of the Central Asian states, geopolitically, 
was clear for the entire period of independence. The states 
naturally turned out to be unprepared for the dramatic 
geopolitical transformation that then hit the region. 
“Access to resources [of the region - F.T.] and receiving 
a share of its potential wealth, - writes Brzezinsky, 
- represent those goals, which stimulate national 
ambitions, determine corporate interest, enliven 
historical demands, revive imperial aspirations and kindle 
international rivalry... Geostrategic implications are clear 
for America: America is too far away to dominate in this 
part of Eurasia, but too powerful not to be involved... 
Russia is too weak to restore its imperial domination over 
the region or exclude such domination on the part of 
other powers, but too close and strong to be excluded.” 
(Brzezinski, Zb. The Grand Chessboard. American 
Primacy аnd its Geostrategic Imperatives (BasicBooks 
- Harper Collins Publishers, Inc, 1997), p. 125, 148)
All of this put Central Asians into a very diffi  cult 
situation. They had to take advantage of the uniqueness 
of their geopolitical situation, increase the attention 
paid to them internationally, and reinforce their image in 
international relations as a region: being ready to meet 
the challenges of the time by coordinating their foreign 
policy, and demonstrating regional strategy as a primary 
direction in their foreign orientations. This regionalization 
of relations, as it was mentioned in the beginning 
of the paper, is the imperative of the modern world.
However, a narrow, limited understanding of the 
world, global processes, the nature of world order after 
the end of the “cold war” and failure to be ready to 
develop adequate response to geopolitical challenges, 
determined the relevance of an exclusively old model 
of the “balance of power” with the new international 
relations in the post-Soviet area. Moreover, a Minor 
Game among the states of the region is unfolding 
against the background of the Great Game in the region. 
As a result, Central Asia has not so far gained its common 
geopolitical place. The recent merger of the Organization 
of the Central Asian Cooperation (OCAC) with the 
Eurasian Economic Cooperation (retaining the name of 
the association “EEC”) became a striking confi rmation.
Central Asia continues to remain as both a geographic 
and historical reality. Out of the three factors mentioned 
(which inhibit the process of regional integration in Central 
Asia) the fi rst - related to the necessity of the creation of 
statehood - loses its topicality in view of the completion 
of this task over the 15-year period. Now it seems that it 
is possible to switch from state to regional construction. 
The second, subjective factor is transient by nature. 
Remaining is the third - the geopolitical factor. This is a 
very complex issue in view of the present proliferation 
of geopolitical actors in the region. At the same time, 
out of all these players, a symbolic geopolitical triangle 
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comprising the USA-Russia-China in Central Asia should 
be noted. Our analysis of the policies of the states of this 
triangle demonstrates that it is possible to envisage four 
possible future geopolitical manifestations in Central Asia.
The fi rst is the status of a buff er zone. Most likely this 
is in the interests of Russia for two reasons: one reason 
is of an off ensive character - considering the Central 
Asian region as a zone of its historical responsibility 
and geopolitical control in its long-term reach towards 
the Indian Ocean; another reason is of a protective 
character - considering the Central Asian region as 
a zone, which protects Russia/empire from direct 
contact with a geopolitical opponent (fi rst it was Great 
Britain, later, the USA). Only the buff er status of Central 
Asia could serve such geopolitical interests of Russia.
The second possible status is that of a sanitary 
cordon. This would be more in the interests of the 
USA, which pursues the strategy of geopolitical 
pluralism, and proclaims its aspiration not to allow 
(or prevent) domination of any power in Central Asia.
The third possible role is as a base for expansion, 
which most of all would be in the interests of China. China 
could objectively consider Central Asia as its geopolitical 
rear and be predisposed to using the region in its 
movement to the West. This movement may take one 
of the two forms - territorial expansion or the extension 
of the sphere of economic and political infl uence 
(although the fi rst scenario is unlikely to happen).
All of the scenarios mentioned above cannot 
objectively be accepted by Central Asian states since all 
these three positions primarily imply their subordination 
in some form or other to the will and actions of external 
powers, and disregard the will and role of Central Asians.
Therefore, the only relevant choice of the states of the 
region (a fourth status) is to become a united center of 
power. At present it becomes more evident that they 
cannot be totally independent and sovereign states 
unless they realize the principle of an integrated, 
independent and sovereign region. Such a “project”, 
if it is destined to happen, is primarily in the interests 
of all global and regional powers - the participants of 
Central Asian geopolitics. Therefore the approaches of 
these participants towards this project may serve as an 
exact test of their real intentions in this part of the world.
